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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

It is not surprising that the School District and the Hennefers have some
differences on the interpretation of the evidence. However, the Hennefers agree with
Judge Elgee that there was "substantial agreement among the experts of what
happened here."

(Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1289.) On appeal, the issue is whether there was

substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict. There can be no dispute the jury's
verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
The School District attacks the expert testimony of Dr. Gill asserting that it
addresses on!y the "state of mind" of Mr. Lopez and Austin Hennefer and that it is only
"specuiation." However, Dr. Gill's testimony was used to explain the actual testimony of
the other witnesses. The use of Dr. Gill was entirely consistent with Rules of Evidence
702 and 703.
First, Dr. Gill helped explain the discrepancy between Mr. Lopez' statements that
when he first saw the Buick it was off the road and the testimony from Jennifer Mares
that they stayed on the road.
Mr. Lopez told Raul Ornelas at the crash site immediately after the crash that:
He (Lopez) noticed a vehicle off the side of the road up ahead of him. Mr.
Lopez told me that he - as he got closer, he slowed down, and as he got
really close up to the vehicle he moved over to his right - I mean to his
left, towards the center of the road. I remember Mr. Lopez was shaking
his head. He goes, I don't know why they did it, but the car turned in front
of me." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 371, II. 10 -17.) (Emphasis added.)
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Other evidence, primarily the testimony of Jennifer Mares, indicated the drivers
training car was never off the roadway at all. Therefore, it was necessary to reconcile
the testimony of Mr. Lopez that he saw a red light "off the side of the road" and Mares
that they executed a three-point turn in the road. The expert testimony of Dr. Gill helped
explain that in the dark and due to the curve in the road, only the marker light would be
visible and it appeared to be off to the right from a distance. Once the Lopez headlights
illuminated the Buick, Mr. Lopez recognized it was in the westbound lane of the road in
a perpendicular position. Mr. Lopez steered left to avoid the car but according to Mr.
Lopez the car "turned in front of me" 1,,vhicn is entirely consistent with the Buick
attempting to complete the three-point turn into the eastbound lane. Dr. Gill was not
speculating or attempting to read minds. She was only helping the jury to understand
Mr. Lopez' testimony in light of the darkness, orientation of the car, and the roadway
characteristics, which were in evidence.
Dr. Gill also helped explain the testimony of Jennifer Mares, Brian Johns, and
Jeff Mecham. Ms. Mares testified Mr. Mecham instructed Austin Hennefer to perform a
three-point turn. (Mares testimony, Tr., Vol. I, p. 480, II. 22 - 24.) Brian Johns testified:

Q: Is that one of the ways that you get control of the kids?
A: It is. They are shocked that they can fail purely for attitude, but that's
an important part of safe driving is a good attitude.
Q: Would attitude include doing what your instructor tells you to do when
he te!ls you to do it?
A: !t could. (Tr., Vol. ! of II, Part 2, p. 623, !I. 16 -23.) (Emphasis added.)
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Jeff Mecham also testified Austin Hennefer trusted Mr. Mecham and did what Mr.
Mecham told him to do like his other students.
Q: Do you think Austin trusted you?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you have reason to think that they trusted you? Did they do what
you told them to do?
A: They never had done anything different.
Q: They had always done what you asked them to do?
A: Yes. (Tr. Vol. II of 11, p. 952, II. 13-19.)
Dr. Gill helped explain the scientific basis for why students obey the commands
of an instructor.

Dr. Gili's testimony was entirely consistent with the testimony of

Jennifer Mares, Brian ,johns. and Jeff Mecham. It was simply offered to assist the triei
of fact to understand the evidence.

It was neither "speculative" nor "state of mind"

evidence.
Substantial evidence supports the Hennefers' claims that Mr. Mecham instructed
Austin Hennefer to perform a three-point turn on Highway 20 on icy roads in darkness
and directly in front of an oncoming car. The Lopez Honda's headlights would have
been visible to Mr. Mecham and Mr. Mecham testified he looked over his left shoulder
as they were pulling off to the right side of the iOad. He also testified he recalls looking
over his left shoulder and seeing headlights coming.
(Mecham testimony) We would have turned the signai to the right, and I
would have had them pull off halfway off the road. Then we would have
come to a complete stop. I would have them check over their left
CROSS APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 3

shoulder. I would have also checked over my left shoulder. (Tr., Vol. II of
II, p. 924, II. 11 - 15.) (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Mecham also testified he recalls looking over his left shoulder and seeing
headlights coming.
Q: (By Hepworth) So you remember looking over your left shoulder?

A: Yes.
Q: And you remember seeing headlights coming?

A: Yes. (Tr., Vol. II of II, p. 942, II. 21 - 25.) (Emphasis added.)
The Hennefers have never characterized the traffic as "heavy" but there were
clearly numerous cars on the road and it was during normal commute hour.

The

School District apparently admits the existence of the driveway near the crash site but
claims "there is no evidence that the one driveway was visible to Mr. Mecham at the
time of the accident.'; (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 3.) The School District makes the
argument despite the testimony of Dennis Hennefer that the "driveway and this yard has
a big yard light, and in the dark it shows that yard up like a beacon." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 339,
II. 4 - 6.)

The Court is also requested to examine the police photos admitted into

evidence Ex. 15. 7 and Ex. 15. 13, which prove the proximity of the farmhouse driveway
to the crash site.
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II.
LAW AND ARGUMENT

A.

THE "WILLFUL OR RECKLESS" INSTRUCTION WAS CORRECT

I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a) provides that the limitation on non-economic damage does
not apply where the cause of action arises out of "willful or reckless misconduct." The
School District incorrectly claims "The Hennefers do not contest that the jury instruction
was incorrect" despite the heading of the brief section entitled "The Court's Reckless
Instruction was Correct." The Hennefers have no explanation for the School District's
misrepresentation and again emphasize the reckless instruction was indeed cmrect
based upon the iongstanding and recently reaffirmed law.
ignored Idaho law.

Idaho has long used the

The School District has

Restatement of Torts definition of

"reckless."
In 1958 the Idaho Supreme Court relied on the First Restatement of Torts
definition of reckless misconduct in Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475 (1958).
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important
particulars. It differs from that form of negligence which consists in mere
inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take
precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or
probable future emergency in that reckless misconduct requires a
conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the
serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which
would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. 2 Restatement of the
Law of Torts§ 500g. Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475 at 480 (1958).
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In 2012 the Idaho Supreme Court again relied on the Restatement of Torts§ 500
in describing the legal standard for "willful or reckless" specifically in reference to I.C. §
6-1603(4)(a).
We affirm the trial court and hold that willful or reckless misconduct is a
form of negligence that involves both intentional conduct and knowledge
of a substantiai risk of harm. Carillo v. Boise Tire Co .. Inc~, 152 Idaho 741
at 751 (2012).
The Court in Carillo then goes on to quote State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358 (1961)
which quoted the Restatement (First) of Torts § 500 cmt.g (1934). The lengthy quote
was previously set forth on page 23 of the Hennefers' initial brief and need not be
repeated here. However, it is important to note that the Second and Third Restatement
of Torts comments further clarify what is reckless conduct and are helpful.
§ 500 Reckless Disregard of safety Defined. The actor's conduct is in
reckiess disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionaliy
fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make his conduct negligent. § 500 Restatement of the Law
Second Torts § 500 p. 587.
This definition and Idaho case law is entirely consistent with the tiial court's
instruction on "willful or reckless" which was the Idaho Pattern Jury Instruction 2.25.
This was the instruction recommended by a "select committee of judges and lawyers"
which drafted the IDJl2d instruction ''upon order of the Supreme Court." (See Idaho
Jury Instructions 2003 version a. Preface to IDJI 2d.)
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It is also important to consider comment d to the Second Restatement. It is not
necessary to prove Mr. Mecham actually saw the Lopez vehicle. It is sufficient to prove
Mr. Mecham had knowledge of others within the danger zone.
d. Knowledge of presence of others within danger zone. If the actor's
conduct is such to involve a high degree of risk that serious harm will
result from it to anyone who is within range of its effect, the fact that he
knows or has reason to know that others are within such range is
conclusive of the recklessness of his conduct toward them. It is not,
however, necessary that the actor know that there is anyone within the
area made dangemus by his conduct. It is enough that he knows that
there is strong probability that others may rightfully come within such
zone. Restatement of Torts 2 nd § 500, comment d, p. 589.
It is also important to understand the distinction between reckless conduct and
intentional misconduct.
f.
Intentional misconduct and recklessness contrasted. Reckless
misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing in a very important
particular. While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the
actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough
that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is
a strong probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even
expects that his conduct will prove harmless.
However, a strong
probability is a different thing from the substantial certainty without which
he cannot be said to intend the harm in which his act resuits.
It is also helpful to consider the Restatement (Third) of Torts description of
recklessness.
A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if:
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows
facts that make the risk obvious to another in the person's situation, and
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens
that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the
person's failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person's
CROSS APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 7

indifference to the risk. Restatement (Third) of Torts; Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm§ 2 (2010).

B.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF WILLFUL OR RECKLESS
MISCONDUCT

The School District argues there was no substantial evidence supporting the
jury's and trial court's finding of recklessness. Like Mr. Mecham, the School District fails
to consider its own teaching materials that address turnabouts. Mr. Mecham was taught
by Mr. Johns using the Drive Right Manual. The Drive Right Manual was used by Mr.
Mecham.

Therefore, the evidence shows Mr. Mecham had actual knowledge of the

lessons he taught. Very important excerp1s include:
1. Objectives.
4. Describe five .turnabouts and tell which is the safest to use. (Ex. 77, p.
113.)
2. Turning the Vehicle Around ....
Take these precautions when you plan to make a turnabout:
--Never attempt a turnabout in heavy or high-speed traffic. (Ex. 77. P.
·116.) (Emphasis added.)
3. Three-Point Turnabout This turnabout is hazardous to perform. You not only
cross traffic lanes, but your vehicle is stopped across a traffic lane. Executing
this maneuver may put you in a high-risk situation. (Ex.77, p.118.) (Emphasis
added.)
4. Deciding Which Turnabout to Use. A three-point turnabout should rarely be
used. Use this turnabout only when you are on a dead end street or on a
rural roadway with no driveways. (Ex. 77, p.118).
Utilizing the Restatement comments as a guide, it is clear there is substantial
evidence of recklessness. The Hennefers presented direct evidence that Mr. Mecham
CROSS APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 8

was taught to make a "route plan" in advance of driving. There is evidence Mr. Mecham
decided in advance to drive 30 minutes west on Highway 20 and execute a three-point
turn. Mr. Mecham knew it was his job responsibility to teach the "safest turnabout" to
his students but instead chose to practice a "hazardous" turnabout that "may put you in
a high risk situation." He was taught to "never attempt a turnabout in high speed traffic"
but clearly knew Highway 20 had a 65 mph speed limit.
There is direct evidence that Mr. Mecham knew the Lopez car was coming. He
specifically admitted he remembered he looked over his left shoulder and saw
headlights. (Tr. Vol. ii, p.942, IL 21 - 25.) Looking over your shoulder is what you do
when you are looking behind the car.

This had to occur as the car was pointed

westbound before starting the three point turn. If he saw the headlights when the car
was perpendicular in the road, he would see the headiights by simply looking left, not
over the shoulder.

If he saw the headlights immediately before impact; he would be

looking almost straight ahead through the front windshield. It was Mr. Mecham;s own
description of "looking over his shoulder and seeing headlights'' that supports the
contention he saw Lopez' car before instructing Austin Hennefer to do a three-point
tum.

Even without Mr. Mecham's own testimony, there is ample testimony from

jennifer Mares that there were cars in the "zone of danger." Given the testimony it may
take 30 seconds to complete a three-point tum, the zone of danger includes any car
within 30 seconds.
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The testimony of Dennis Hennefer and the police photos also address the
recklessness of Mr. Mecham.

The Restatement specifically addresses the slight

precautions that could have been taken to avoid danger.

Mr. Mecham could have

planned to turn around in the driveway that was "lit up like a beacon" a few hundred feet
from the crash site. Mr. Mecham could have planned any turnabout maneuver other
than a three-point turn and minimized risk. Mr. Mecham could have chosen to practice
icy road driving only in town given the unexpected conditions. Despite Mr. Mecham's
knowledge of the hazardous conditions, hazardous roadway, hazard associated with a
three-point turn, presence of vehicles in the zone of danger, and availaoi!ity of safer
turnabout options, Mr. Mecham demonstrated indifference to the risks.

As a

consequence, Austin Hennefer was killed and Jennifer Mares seriously injured.

Mr.

Mecham totally disregarded his duty to teach the safest practices.

C.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1.

Introduction.

The Schooi District contends the jury was not instructed on Austin Hennefer's
negligence duty, was not instructed on Mr. Lopez' negligence duty, and that the duty to
keep a lookout only applied to Austin Hennefer and Mr. Lopez. A review of the jury
instructions given show these allegations are incorrect.

Further,

under the

circumstances of this case, Mr. Mecham had a duty to keep a lookout. The instructions
as a whole properly instructed the jury. Finally, the lookout instruction requested by the
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School District was highly prejudicial, misleading, and would have been reversible error
had it been given.
2.

The Jury was Properly Instructed on Austin Hennefer's Duty of Due Care.

The Schoo! District argues that the Court did not include instructions regarding
Austin Hennefer;s duty. It is important to note at the outset there are essentially two
causes of action at issue in this case; a claim for negligence and a claim of negligence
per se. Regarding Austin Hennefer, them is no claim by the Schoo! District that Austin
Hennefer violated any statute that would support a negligence per se claim. The School
District only generaily aileged Austin Hennefer breached a generai duty of due care and

was generaHy negligent.
The difference between negligence and negligence per se was addressed in
Munns v. Swift Transportation, Inc., 138 Idaho 108 (2002).

In that case, a horse

escaped an enclosure and got out on the road and was struck and killed by a Swift
Transportation truck. The truck subsequently left without removing the horse from the
road.

Sometime later Munns drove along and was unable to see the horse due to

darkness and struck the horse. As a result of the collision, Munns was seriously injured.
Munns sued Swift Transportation and the horse owner.

At trial the court gave both

general negligence instructions and a negligence per se instruction for violation of I.C.§
49-1301(1) which required the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to remain at
the scene "until he has fulfilled the requirements of law." The jury returned a verdict
finding Swift Transportation 80% at fault. Swift appealed and contended the negligence
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per se instruction did not apply and requested a new trial. The Supreme Court agreed
that the statute did not apply and therefore only the general negligence instruction
should have been given.
Thus, because the four-part test of Sanchez v. Galey has not been met,
we conclude that I.C. § 49-1301(1) cannot be held to define conduct that
would give rise to negligence per se under the facts of this case. We hold
that instruction 31 should not have been given to the jury. Munns v. Swift
Transportation. Inc., 138 Idaho 108 at 111 (2002).
There has been no claim by the School District that a negligence per se claim
can be made against Austin Hennefer.

The Schoo! District claims the general

negligence instmctio11s did not properly instruct the jury of Austin Hennefer's duty.
However, a review of the jury instructions given by the court show that allegation is
incorrect.

There were two specific instructions specifically advising the jury Austin

Hennefer had a duty of ordinary care. The first was Instruction No. 9:
Instruction No. 9
It was the QY.tt of Jeffrey Mecham, Sergio Lopez-Rodriguez, and Austin
Hennefer, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care
for the safety of themselves and each other. (CR p. 207.) (Emphasis
added.)
Instruction No. 1O was given to the jury to define "negligence" and "ordinary
care." Instruction No. ;5 was also given emphasizing Austin Hennefer's duty as an
aduit driver and iiability for his own negligence.
Instruction No. 15
All drivers, including a minor operating a motor vehicle on a public
highway, are charged with the same standard of conduct as an adult. A
person learning to operate a motor vehicle under the tutelage of another Is
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liable for injuries resulting from his own negligence in operation of such
vehicle. (CR, p. 213.) (Emphasis added.)
Although the School District has not made the argument Austin Hennefer was
negligent per se, it is clear the jury was properly instructed on negligence per se for
violating I.C. § 49-645, limitations on turning around. (Instruction No. 18, CR., p. 216.)
That statute specifically applies to "drivers" in section (1).

It is apparent the jury

concluded Mr. Mecham was responsible for the decision to execute a three-point turn
and Austin Hennefer should not be responsible for Mr. Mecham's decision.
3.

The Jury Was Properly Instructed on Mr. Lopez' Duty of Care.

As previously set forth above, Instruction No. 9 instructed the jury that all three
parties including Mr. Lopez had a duty to use ordinary care for the safety of themselves
and each other. Instruction No. 10 defining negligence and ordinary care a!so applied
to Mr. Lopez. Therefore, the general negligence instructions were properly given to the
jury. In addition, Instruction No. 19 gave a negligence per se instruction that applied
only to Mr. Lopez regarding speed.
Instruction No. 19
There was a certain statute in force in the State of Idaho at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that:
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is
reasonable under the conditions and having regard to the actual
and potential hazards then existing. Consistent with the foregoing,
every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed ... when
special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or
by reason of weather or highway conditions.
A violation of the statute is negligence. (CR., 217.)
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Clearly, the jury was properly instructed on both general negligence and
negligence per se liability of both Mr. Lopez and Austin Hennefer. The School District's
argument must fail.
4.

The Claim the Lookout Duty Only applied to Austin Hennefer and Mr.
Lopez is not Supported by the Facts or Law.

In Idaho, a teacher has a legal duty to properly supervise their students.
Accordingly, we find there is a duty, which arises between a teacher or
school district and a student. This duty has previously been recognized by
this Court as simply a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising
students while they are attending school. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484
at 480 (1995).
Under the specific facis of the driver's training class scenario, Mr. Johns testified
that a student was required to obey their teacher and a teacher was expected to make
sure it was safe before ordering a student to perform a maneuver.
Q: And I think you said in response to Mr. Farley that it's the instructor's
responsibility to look first before instructing the student to do something?
A. Correct, always. {Tr., Vol. I, p. 680, II. 12 -15.)
Specifically with regard to three-point turn maneuvers, Mr. Mecham admitted that
he too would look to see if cars were coming before doing a three-point turn.
A:
Okay. On a three-point turn what I would have had the students do
is first we would have to look in our rear-view mirror, and I would have
looked over my back shoulder - my left shoulder to see if there was
anybody right behind us. . . . (Tr., Vol. II of 11, p. 924, II. 7 - 11.)
The .law specifically requires teachers to supervise their students. There is no
specific law requiring teachers to keep a lookout in a driver's training class, therefore a
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negligence per se instruction is not available. However, Mr. Johns taught Mr. Mecham
to look before giving a command for safety purposes and Mr. Mecham understood he
had that responsibility. Therefore, it would be error to instruct the jury Mr. Mecham had
no duty to keep a lookout, but the drivers had a duty to do so.
Where the evidence and facts presented at trial do not support a requested jury
instruction, it is not error to refuse to give a requested instruction.

In this case, the

evidence does not support Mr. Mecham's claim he did not have a duty to keep a
lookout.
Our review of the testimony at trial reveals that there was no evideni:iary
support for a statute of frauds jury instruction. Mackay v. Four River.§
Packing Co., 151 idaho 388 at 393 (2011).
5. The Regu~sted Jury Instruction Would Mislead the Jury and Preiµdice Austin_
Hennefer.
The specific instruction requested by the School District and rejected by the court
was misleading and highly prejudicial to the Hennefers because it to!d the jury Mr.
Mecham did not have a duty to keep a lookout. It was also misleading because it did
not account for poor visibility due to darkness and the perpendicular orientation of the
Buick. The instruction requested is set forth as follows:
The law required that all drivers keep a proper lookout. Vehicle operators
are required to keep their vehicles under control at all times, considering
actual and potential hazards. It is not only the duty of the operator to look,
but it is his duty to see and be cognizant of that which is plainly visible or
obviously apparent, and a failure on his part in this regard, without proper
justification or reason, makes him chargeable for a failure to see what he
should have seen had he been in the exercise of reasonable care. (CR., p.
146). (Emphasis added.)
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This requested jury instruction is extremely misleading and prejudicial for many
reasons.

First and foremost, it only applied to "drivers." Therefore, the jury was in

effect instructed Mr. Mecham did not have a duty to keep a lookout. That would allow
Mr. Mecham to instruct Austin Hennefer to perform a three-point turn when Mr. Mecham
knew it was hazardous to do so. The instruction essentially immunizes Mr. Mecham
from Mr. Mecham's negligence.
The instruction also is misleading because it required Mr. Lopez and Austin
Hennefer to both "see and be cognizant of that which is plainly visible." This imposes a
duty akin to supe, human abilities given the facts of this case whera visibility was poor.

From Austin Hennefer's perspective, it is unlikely an inexperienced driver wou!d
appreciate the length of time it takes to do a three-point turn. A young driver would
likely not appreciate another car 30 seconds away as a hazard.

Yet, under the

instruction, he is held to a strict liability standard whereas the instructor gets immunity.
The other misleading language in the instruction is the phrase "makes him
chargeable for a failure to see .... " That language is confusing, It sounds as though it
requires a finding of negligence per se for failing to see.

It is important to note the

instruction in not based upon a statute. There is no "lookout" statute and therefore the
very specific instruction is highly prejudicial, one sided, and misleading.
6.

Conclusion.

VVhere the.jury.instructions as a whole, do not mislead or prejudice a party, there
is no reversible error.
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The standard of review for issues concerning jury instructions is limited to
a determination of whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and
adequately present the issues and state the law. Chapman v. Chapman,
147 Idaho 756 at 762 (2009).
As a whole, the jury instructions properly presented the issues of both general
negligence and negligence per se and accurately set forth the law.

The so-called

"lookout" instruction would have been extremely misleading and prejudicial and was
properly rejected.

D.

CLOSING ARGUMENT

The School District claims the final argument of Hennefers' counsel resulted in
passion and pre!udice when there was reference to government studies on the value of
life, The School District objected. The Court sustained the objection and commented
that there was no evidence in the record to support the argument.. (Sup. Tr., p. 49, II. 3

-7).
Improper statements during closing argument do not amount to reversible
error if the "objection is sustained and the Court gives corrective
instructions to the jurt." Bailey v. Sanford, 139 idaho 744 at 752 (2004).
The School District claims counsel's argument in closing created passion and
prejudice when there were comments about the School District's denial of any fault.
(See Sup. Tr., p. 28, II. 5 - p. 3, II. 5.)

The School District did not object to the

comments at trial and therefore waived the issue.

Vve initialiy note that the defense counsel did not object to these remarks
either during or on completion of the prosecutor's closing argument. The
general rule in Idaho is that in absence of a timely objection to an alleged
error at trial, an appellate court will not consider the alleged error on
appeal. State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839 at 844 (1982).
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It is also generally the rule in Idaho that counsel is given broad latitude to argue
in closing.
As this Court explained in Leavitt v. Swain, during closing arguments
"counsel for both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in their arguments to the jury and have the right to discuss fully,
from their respective standpoints, the evidence and inferences and
deductions arising therefrom. Bailey v. Sanford 139 Idaho 744 at 752
(2004).
Lastiy, the School District claims Hennefers' counsel improperly commented on
the jury verdict form.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 38) (Sup. Tr. p. 89, II. 19 - p. 90, II. 7.)

However, counsels' rebuttal argument was expressly in response to an argument of the
Schoo! District.
I want to rebut a few things that Mr. Fariey said. He said that the Judge is
instructing you on Austin Hennefer's negligence, and that's true, he is.
That's because the School District asked him to instruct on the negligence
of Austin Hennefer. And it's for you to consider, no doubt about that, but
don't put any weight on that.
If that's true, then when the Judge instructed the jury on recklessness, and
· if you look at the jury verdict form, there is no allegation that Sergio Lopez
was reckiess because there's no basis for that. i/1/e contend the School
District was reckless because it was, and the Judge has instructed you on
reckless because he thinks the facts support it. (Sup. Tr., p. 89, II. 19 - p.
90, II. 7.)

There was no objection to this argument at trial.

Therefore, it was waived.

Furthermore, the School District invited the rebuttal by making the argument that the
Court had determined each party was negligent. The School District's attorney argued:
And the first three questions on the verdict form relate to questions about
each one of the individuals' negligence that the Court has determined that
you have to consider. And these are the Court's instructions. They aren't
CROSS APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 18

the District's instructions. They aren't the Hennefers' instructions. It's the
Judge's . . . .
Because if there wasn't enough evidence for you to
consider those three questions, they wouldn't be on there. So it's not what
the District is trying to do here. (Sup. Tr., p. 53, II. 13-24.)
The School District "opened the door" and cannot now complain:
Plaintiffs' counsel's comments regarding settlement with the seller of the
stove were made in response to Defendant's closing argument concerning
the responsibility of that seller. Even if we assume arguendo, that the
mention of the effect of the settlement with the seller of the stove was
improper, defendant opened the door on this subject by its argument, and
it was permissible for plaintiff's counsei to respond. Halliburton v. Pubiic
Service Co. of Colorado, 804 P.2d 213 at 218 (Colo. App 1990.)

E.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The School District contends that the legislature enacted a statute that set a cap
for non-economic damages and that any award above that amount is punitive damages.
The School District goes on to mistakenly argue that the standard for awarding punitive
damages is the same as the willful or reckless standard set forth in the non-economic
damage cap exception.

In its tortured and mistaken logic, the School District then

concludes "permitting the piercing of the tort (sic) cap is a de facto allowance of punitive
damages. (Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 19.)
The School District argument is mistaken on all three premises. 1) The jury is
the finder of fact and makes a subjective determination on a case by case basis of an
appropriate award of non-economic damages which frequently exceeds the artificial cap
set by the legislature.

2) The standard of willful or reckless is not the same as the

standard for punitive damages; and therefore, the non-economic damages assessed by
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the jury are not punitive damages. 3) The non-economic cap does not apply if the
Defendant acted willfully or recklessly.

1. The Jury as the Finder of Fact Makes a "Subjective" Determination of an
Appropriate Award of Non-economic Damages, Not the Legislature.
The law is clear that the legislature intended juries to make an independent and
"subjective" determination of an appropriate award of non-economic damages without
any influence from the legislature. Only after the jury has made its decision does the
trial court enforce the law by reducing the jury award if appropriate. If the jury has also
determined the Defendant acted willfully or recklessly, the jury's award is not reduced.
This interpretation is based upon a plain reading of the statute.

(3) If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the
limitation contained in subsection (1) of this section. LC. § 6-1603(3).
The obvious purpose of allowing the jury to determine non-economic damages
without being informed of the statutory cap is to allow the jury to make a fair
assessment based upon the evidence and without influence of the cap. This is not a
worker's compensation case where there are referees following a set formula.

The

legislature clearly understood every case is different. A jury of 12 people is the best
method of assuring fairness. The right to a jury trial is sacred.
In the event the jury finds as a matter of fact that the Defendant acted willfully or
recklessly, the jury's determination is binding. The legislature did not intend to reduce
jury awards where reckless conduct is present.
(4) The limitation of awards of non-economic damages shall not apply to:
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(a) Causes of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct.
I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a).
The legislature also specifically recognized that an award of non-economic
damages is subjective and therefore differ from case to case, jury to jury, and Plaintiff to
Plaintiff.
(5) "Non-economic damages" means subjective non-monetary
losses, including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, disability or disfigurement incurred by the injured party; emotional
distress, loss of society and companionship; loss of consortium; or
destruction of the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 6-1601(5). (Emphasis
added.)

The fact the legislature specificaliy used the word "subjective" when describing
non-economic damages was a recognition of the uniqueness of every determination.
The word "subjective" as defined means.
Subjective 1 Based on an individual's perception, feelings, or intentions
as opposed to externally verifiable phenomena. 2. Personal, individuaL
Blacks Law Dictionary 10th ed. {2014)
Clearly, the legislature understood non-economic damages can only be
determined by a jury on a subjective basis. Every case is different. The legislature
clearly did not intend to interfere with the 12-person jury's exclusive role in assessing
non-economic damages. It is only after the jury has made its decision that the Court
may reduce the award to comply with the cap statute.

The Idaho Supreme Court

explained the relative roles of the legislature and a jury in Kirkland v. Blaine County
Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464 (2000).
Nothing in the statute prohibits a plaintiff from presenting his or her full
case to the jury and having the jury determine the facts of the case based
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on the evidence presented at trial. The jury is not instructed about the
cap, and is free to make all factual determinations relevant to the case.
Once those factual determinations have been made, it is then up to the
judge to apply the law to the facts as found by the jury. While some courts
have held this procedure simply "plays lip service to the form of the jury
but robs the institution of its function." Lakin v. Senco Products. Inc,, 329
Or. 62, 987, P.2d 463, 473 (1999) (quoting Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112
Wash. 2 nd 636, 771 P .2d 711, 721 (1989)), we disagree. In this case, the
Kirklands had a jury trial during which they were entitled to present all of
their claims and evidence to the jury and have the jury render a verdict
based on that evidence. That is all to which the right to jury entitles them.
The legal consequences and effect of a jury's verdict are a matter for the
legislature (by passing laws) and the courts (by applying those laws to the
facts as found by the jury). Therefore, we hold I.C. § 6-1603 does not
violate the right to jury trial as guaranteed by Article 1, § 7 of the Idaho
Constitution. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464 at
469 (2000).
This Court aiso addressed the societal interests served by I.C. § 6-1603. The
reckless conduct exception should "encourage settlements by giving defendants
additional incentive to settle." The court also commented on the public interest purpose
of imposing sanctions on "those bringing frivolous lawsuits." The Court explained the
legislative purpose:
The legislative history behind I.C. § 6-1603 reveals the statute was passed
as part of a larger legislative package aimed at addressing concerns that
large civil jury veidicts were driving up the cost of iiability insurance. As
part of the bill which included I.C. § 6-1603, the legislature also included
reforms to the liability insurance business so Idaho policyholders would
have more control over the prices and conditions of liability insurance;
legislation designed to encourage settlements by giving defendants
additional incentive to settle and by giving the courts greater latitude to
impose sanctions on those bringing frivolous lawsuits; and some
limitations on the application of joint and several liability. See Act of April
1, 1987, ch. 278, 1987 idaho Session Laws 571. Bv striking this balance
between a tort victim's right to recover noneconomic damages and
society's interest in preserving the availability of affordable liability
insurance, the legislature "is engaging in its fundamental and legitimate
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role of 'structur[ing] and accommodate[ing] the burdens and benefits of
economic life."' Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir.
1996) {citations omitted). Additionally, it should be noted I.C. § 6-1603
expressly exempts tortfeasors who are found to have acted recklessly or
feloniously from the limitation of liability.
Therefore, contrary to the
Kirk!ands' assertions, the statute does not arbitrarily limit the liability of all
defendants causing severe injuries. Because we find the state had a
legitimate interest in protecting the availability of liability insurance for
Idaho citizens, and I.C. § 6-1603 is neither an arbitrary, capricious, nor
unreasonable method for addressing this legitimate societal concern, we
find I.C. § 6-1603 does not violate the constitutional prohibition against
special legislation. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medicai Center, 134 Idaho
464 at 470 (2000).

2. The Standard for Assessing Punitive Damage is Different Than the Willful or
Reckless Standard.
The entire premise of the School District argument is based upon the mistaken
belief that a finding of willful or reckless misconduct translates to an award of punitive
damages. This argument is easily disposed of by reading Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385
Fed. 3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2004). Kuntz was severely injured in an accident while he was
changing a billboard sign. He came in contact with high power electrical lines and was
eiectrocuted. Prior to trial Kuntz made a motion to include a ciaim for punitive damages.
The trial court denied the motion. At trial the Judge submitted the issue of whether the
Defendant's conduct was willful or reckless for purposes of the non-economic damage
cap. I.C. § 6-1603(4){a). The jury found the Defendant's conduct reckless and awarded
$19,931,504.00 in damages. Kuntz appealed the Court's decision denying the motion
to add a claim for punitive damage. The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the trial court's
decision that the evidence did not support a claim for punitive damages.
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The Claimant must show "that the defendant acted in a manner that was
an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, that the act
was performed . . . with an understanding of or disregard for its likely
consequences, and the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state
of mind." (Citation omitted.) The District Court did not abuse its discretion
in denying leave to amend on the ground that Kuntz had not established a
reasonable likelihood of proving the requisite "extremely harmful state of
mind." Kuntz v. Lamar Corp. 385 Fed- 3d 1177 at 1186 (9th Cir. 2004).
Both premises that the School District relies upon to claim the jury awarded
punitive damages are mistaken. The legislature did not intend to invade the role of the
jury and the standard of awarding punitive damages is not the same as only showing
willful or reckless misconduct.
3. Jh~ Non-economic Damages Assessed by the Jury Were not Intended as
Punitive Damages.
The Schoo! District offers no evidence whatsoever in supoort of its assertion the
jury disregarded the jury instructions and awarded punitive damages. it is interesting to
note that the School District makes no effort to argue the evidence did not support the
award of non-economic damages. The School District does not contest the testimony of
MaryAnn Hennefer or Dennis Hennefer about the nature of their relationship with Austin
Hennefer, their 15 year old son. The judge cmrectly characterized the relationship as
very close.

The testimony was extremely compelling.

However, the School District

simply ignores the testimony. The School District has therefore waived any argument
that the testimony did not support a substantial award of non-economic damages.
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4. Juries May Assess Substantial Non-Economic Damages.
As the Court noted, the Plaintiffs provided the Court with numerous decisions of
awards of non-economic damages in child wrongful death cases ranging from
$250,000.00 to $9,000,000.00. (Tr., p. 1300.) Additionally, there are reported cases of
much larger non-economic damage awards in Idaho
In Kirkland
awarded

v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464 (2000) a Federal jury

a child

$15,000,000.00

in

non-economic damages

and

its parents

$3,500,000.00 in non-economic damages. That was another decision where one of the
Defendants was found to be reckiess but no punitive damages awarded. in Kuntz v.
Lamar, supra, the jury awarded $~9,931,504.00 but the decision does not indicate the
amount of non-economic damages. In _$tate De.Qt of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson,
146 Idaho 439 (2008), a magistrate judge determined an award of $18,000,000.00 was
a reasonable assessment of non-economic damages in an injury case involving
paraplegia. The Supreme Court reduced the award due to the non-economic damage
cap. However, this Court stated:
It may well be that Jonathan's non-economic ioss was correctly calculated
at $18 million. However, because of Idaho's statutory cap on noneconomic damages, a plaintiff can recover nowhere near that amount
either in a judgment or a settlement, absent factors not present here. 8
In footnote 8 the Court references the fact the damage cap does not apply where
there was willful or reckless conduct.
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5. Conclusion
In summary, the jury's award for non-economic damages was based upon the
evidence of exceptionally close parent-child relationships.
instructed on the allowable damages.

The jury was properly

The School District has not challenged the

damage instructions or the evidence supporting the award of damages. The School
District's only argument that Mr. Mecham's reckless conduct supported an award of
punitive damages is inconsistent with the !aw. As a further matter of law, the noneconomic damage cap does not apply because Mr. Mecham's conduct was reckless.

F:

THE SCHOOL DISTRICT HAS NOT PROVEN A NEW TRIAL IS
WARRANTED

The School District continues to mistakenly assert a subjective standard instead
of an objective standard applies to a determination of reckless conduct. However, the
Hennefers have submitted case law wherein Idaho law foilows the Restatement of Law
of Torts objective standard since at least 1958. The objective Restatement test was
used in Hunter v. Hortc,n, 80 Idaho 475 (1958), State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358 (1961),
Phillips v. Erhart, 152 Idaho 741 (2012), Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741
(2012) and !DJl2d Pattern Jury Instructions recommended by a "select committee of
judges and lawyers" which adopted the objective reckless standard in 2003.
The School District also fails to acknowledge the testimony of Jeff Mecham who
testified he recalled "looking over his left shoulder" and seeing headlights coming. (Tr.,
Vol. ii, p. 94, Ii. 12 - 25.) Obviously, if Mr. Mecham saw the headlights immediately
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before impact, he would not be looking "over his left shoulder." Mr. Mecham saw the
headlights before he told Austin Hennefer to do the three-point turn.
This testimony of subjective awareness of immediate danger and disregard of the
danger is the most direct evidence. Additionally, witnesses testified about the presence
of other traffic in the area, the fact three-point turns are the most hazardous and should
rarely be used and turnabouts should not be practiced on high-speed highways. There
was ample evidence supporting the jury's determination.

G.

DR. GILL'S TESTIMONY

To make sure the record is clear; the Hennefers have expressly acknowledged
the School District objected to Dr. Gill's testimony. ("Further, the Cowt entertained the
School District's objections at trial." Respondent's Brief, p. 33.) Therefore, Appellant's
reply brief suggesting otherwise is inaccurate.
A review of Dr. Gill's testimony reveals that she did in fact testify about visibility
issues. The question and answer set forth in the Appellant's Brief related to the legal
duty to drive at a speed that would enable a driver to "perceive and react to a hazard
that may be in the roadway." Dr. Giil actually testified she did not disagree but was not
sure that question was within her expertise. Dr. Gill's response was direct. Dr. Gill's
response that she was troubled by the legal aspects of the question was appropriate.
The School District's allegation that "Dr. Gill would not respond" is unsupported by the
record.
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The School District claims Dr. Gill was "trying to divine Mr. Lopez's thoughts."
The School District fails to acknowledge the testimony of Raul Ornelas describing the
statements made by Mr. Lopez at the accident scene immediately after the crash. Mr.
Ornelas testified that because he was bilingual he was asked to interview Mr. Lopez.
He recounted Mr. Lopez as saying:

A:
(Ornelas) He said after he got on 20 and he was traveling, he
he noticed a vehicle off the side of the road up ahead of him. . .
remember Mr. Lopez was shaking his head. He goes, I don't know
they did it, but the car turned in front of me. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 271, II. 10 Dr. Gill was not attempting to read Mr. Lopez's mind.

said
. . I
why
20.)

She was attempting to

expiain why Mr. Lopez stated that the driver's training car 'was off the side of the road
and then "turned in front of him." Dr. Gill testified that due to the right curve in the road,
which was not evident at night, the driver's training car would appear to be off the right
side of the road. The other expert testimony showed the driver's training car was nearly
perpendicular in the road at impact near the center of the road. The orientation and
direction of travel of the driver's training car would be very similar to a car pulling from a
driveway into the path of the Lopez car.

Dr. Gill's testimony simply explained the

testimony and physical facts previously introduced in evidence by Mr. Maddux, Mr.
Beaufort, Robert Lauman, and Officer Ornelas.
The School District also claims Dr. Gill's testimony only related to "Austin's state
of mind, what he was thinking." Again, the School District is off the mark. The very
obvious issue in this lawsuit was to determine whether it was unreasonable (negligent)
for Austin Hennefer to obey the command of Mr. Mecham, his instructor. Obviously, the
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School District was aware of the contested issue of fact. Consider the final argument
excerpts from the School District.
If your decision is that Austin Hennefer was not negligent and that Jeff
Mecham was, that's your decision. I know ifs going to be based on the
evidence as you see it. But they were both in the car together. One
certainly had more responsibility than the other. There's no doubt about
that." (Sup. Tr., p. 69, Ii. 20 - 25.)
* * * *
And then as between Jeffrey Mecham and Austin Hennefer, again, that's
totaily your decision. And I'm not trying to cop out on this. I mean, it
literally is totally your decision. They were both in the same car. I mean,
certainly Mr. Mecham had more responsibility to undertake to protect his
students, than obviously what Austin Hennefer was trying to do, which is
just try to follow the instructions of his instructor. (Sup. Tr., -. 71, II. 9 16.)
The School District clearly contended Austin Hennefer was negligent for obeying
Mr. Mecham.

The Hennefers contended Austin Hennefer acted reasonably and

predictably, when he obeyed his instructor.

In support of their contention, the

Hennefers elicited the testimony of Brian Johns, Jeff Mecham, and Dr. Gill. Each
witness in effect testified that students were required to obey the instructor. (See Brian
Johns' testimony, Tr. Vol. I, p. 622, II. 23.) (See Jeff Mecham testimony Tr. Vol. 11, p.
952, IL 10 - 22) Dr. Gill simply gave a scientific study that corrobOiated the testimony of

both Brian Johns and Jeff Mecham that students are expected to obey the commands
of the instructor for safety reasons. Dr. Gill's testimony did not address an issue of law.
It addressed the issue of fact the jury had to resolve as to whether Austin Hennefer was
negligent. The Court did not err when allowing Dr. Gill to iestify.
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H.

REQUESTS TO ADMIT

There are two issues regarding an allowance of costs for the School District's
failures to admit Mr. Mecham was negligent and Austin Hennefer was not negligent.
First is a !egal issue of first impression.

The Hennefers contend the Court has the

authority to award costs against a party as a sanction to enhance the efficiency of the
Courts. The rules are intended to assure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
disputes. (See iRCP 1). 'These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." (Last sentence
of Rule 1(a).) Providing a disincentive to unreasonable deniais of requests for admission
further the role of the Court.
The second issue is the reasonableness of the deniaL The final argument of the
School District illustrates the unreasonableness of the denial that Jeff Mecham was not
negligent.

Mr. Farley admitted in final argument, "certainly Mr. Mecham had more

responsibility to undertake to protect his students than, obviously, what Austin Hennefer
was trying to do, which is just trying to follow the instructions of his instructor." (Sup. Tr.

p. 71, II. 9 - 16.) The Hennefers simply agree. It was "certain" that Mr. Mecham was
more negligent and it was obvious Austin Hennefer was not negligent for obeying his
instructor as he was required. The School District acted unreasonably when it denied
the requests for admission, which has resulted in a much more costly and very slow
resolution of this dispute.
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I.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Hennefers request attorney fees on appeal for the bad faith pursuit of this
appeal by the School District. There is considerable case law indicating Idaho follows
the Restatement of the Law of Torts on the issue of recklessness. It is necessary to
prove subjective recklessness under LC. § 6-904C2 but that definition only applies to
Chapter 9 qualified immunity cases. It does not apply to other chapters as pointed out
in Athay v Stacey. 142 Idaho 360 at 365 (2005). The reasonable man standard has
always been applied to the non-economic damage cap "reckless exception." Carillo v.
Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741 (2012).
There is clearly ample evidence of Mr. Mecham's intentional recklessness given
the failure to plan a safe route and safe turnabout location, choosing to perform the
most dangerous turnabout in the most hazardous conditions and location and the
evidence that he looked over "his shoulder and saw headlights."

There is clearly

substantial evidence supporting the verdict and the School District has chosen to ignore
the evidence and only address the evidence they prefer. Much of the argument relied
upon by the School District is in fact inaccurate.
The faiiure to instruct the jury on the "lookout" obligation most likely benefitted the
School District. A proper "lookout" instruction would help the Hennefers and Mr. Lopez
more than the School District. There is no excuse for Mr. Mecham's failure to see the
Lopez headlights. That instruction would only bolster the claim against Mr. Mecham.
The evidence is clear Mr. Lopez did see the marker light of the School District car.
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There was no reason for Mr. Lopez to expect a car off the road (presumably in a
driveway) to pull out in front of Mr. Lopez. Mr. Lopez had the right to assume the other
car would not pull out into his path. Therefore, the "lookout" instruction issue is simply a
red herring argument made in bad faith in an effort to get a new trial.
The argument the jury awarded punitive damages and that any award above the
cap is "de facto punitive damages" is totally baseless. No law was offered in support.
Quick research reveals case law directly contrarf to the argument the iegal standard for
punitive damages is the same as finding of recklessness for purposes of the noneconomic damage cap.
The standard for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the jury. The Defendant must
admit the truth of all of the Plaintiffs' evidence.

(See Appellant's Brief, p. 26.) The

School District understands the proper analysis but then fails to mention or even
consider the Plaintiffs' evidence that supports the jury's decision. The School District
consciously chose to ignore any evidence supporting the jury's decision. it is one thing
to acknowledge the adverse evidence and argue it is outweighed by the defense
evidence.

However, it is quite another thing to completely ignore contrary evidence

and pretend it does not exist. The latter is evidence of bad faith.
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Ill.
CONCLUSION
It is clear there is substantial evidence of Mr. Mecham's willful or reckless
conduct and the court properly instructed the jury on the standard for a finding of
reckless conduct.

The School District has not contested the evidence submitted in

support of the non-economic damages or the damage instructions. There is no basis in
fact or law that the jury av,arded punitive damages. The District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the School District's Motion for New Trial or Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict The trial court erred when it ruled the court did not have
legal authority to award costs under I.R.C.P. 37 and should have awarded reasonable
costs for the School District's unreasonable denials. The Supreme Court should award
costs and attorney fees to the Hennefers under I. C. § 6-91 BA for the School District's
bad faith appeal.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2014.
JEFFREY J. HEPWORTH, P.A.
& ASSOCIATES

Jeffrey J. Hepworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appeliant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 161 5TH
Avenue South, Suite 100, Twin Falls, Idaho, certifies that on the 5th day of September,
2014, he caused a true and correct copy of the RESPONDENTS' REPLY BRIEF to be
forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below, to the
following:

Brian K. Julian
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, ID 83707-7426

Hand Delivered
U.S. Mail
Fax
Fed. Express

Donald J. Farley
Powers, Tolman, Farley, PLLC
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707-9756

Hand Delivered
U.S. Mail
Fax
Fed Express

Kent L. Hawkins
Merrill & Merrill
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

Hand Delivered
U.S. Mail
Fax
Fed. Express

Jeffrey J. Hepworth
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